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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wildlife trafficking is very much in the headline news these 
days.  Booming demand for wildlife products such as ivory and 
rhino horn—especially in Asia—coupled with uneven enforcement 
and porous border controls has fueled a big uptick in the illegal 
wildlife trade.1  In recent years, trafficking rings have morphed from 
small-time gangs into sophisticated and well-organized criminal 
organizations, borrowing many of the tactics we’ve come to expect 
                                                                                                               
* The author is a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP and served on the President’s 
Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking from 2013 to 2016.  I would like to thank 
Katherine Ghilain, Daniel W. Levy and Lisa Handy for their helpful insights and 
comments. 
 1 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING (2014) [hereinafter NATIONAL 
STRATEGY]. 
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from the narcotics cartels.2  The increase in wildlife trafficking has 
had a devastating impact, with a number of species, including 
elephants and rhinoceroses, facing the risk of significant decline or 
even extinction.3  As President Obama’s Task Force on Combatting 
Wildlife Trafficking has explained: 
Wildlife trafficking threatens an increasing variety of 
terrestrial, freshwater, and marine species, including 
but not limited to: elephants, rhinos, tigers, sharks, 
tuna, sea turtles, land tortoises, great apes, exotic 
birds, pangolins, sturgeon, coral, iguanas, 
chameleons, and tarantulas.  Wildlife trafficking is 
facilitated and exacerbated by illegal harvest and 
trade in plants and trees, which destroys needed 
habitat and opens access to previously remote 
populations of highly endangered wildlife, such as 
tigers.  In addition, illegal trafficking of fisheries 
products, among others, threatens food supplies and 
food security.  Many species decimated by illegal 
trade and other threats, such as habitat loss, are now 
in danger of extinction.  Wildlife trafficking 
jeopardizes the survival of iconic species such as 
elephants and rhinos.4 
                                                                                                               
 2 See id.; see also Bryan Christy, Tracking Ivory, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 12, 
2015), http://www.nationalgeographic.com/tracking-ivory/article.html, archived at 
https://perma.cc/RB9N-M3RT (investigating links between ivory trafficking and funding 
for the Lord’s Resistance Army); Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 
114th Cong. 11-12, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-
09-16.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/Z2DQ-SBCS (2016) (statement of James R. 
Clapper, Director of National Intelligence) (“Organized crime and rebel groups in Africa 
and elsewhere are likely to increase their involvement in wildlife trafficking to fund 
political activities, enhance political influence, and purchase weapons.  Illicit trade in 
wildlife, timber, and marine resources endangers the environment, threatens good 
governance and border security in fragile regions, and destabilizes communities whose 
economic well-being depends on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism.  Increased 
demand for ivory and rhino horn in East Asia has triggered unprecedented increases in 
poaching in Sub-Saharan Africa.”). 
 3 NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 4. 
 4 NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 4. 
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Much of the battle against trafficking appropriately has 
focused on reducing demand by raising public awareness. 5   The 
United States and a number of other countries have organized 
highly publicized ivory “crushes,” destroying confiscated ivory in 
part to educate consumers about the poaching crisis and in part as an 
effort to dry up the market for ivory. 6   Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have been busy raising public awareness 
through advertising, much of it focused on curbing demand in the 
Asian market.7 
This article focuses on the enforcement side of the fight 
against the illegal wildlife trade.  Drawing on a case I handled as a 
federal prosecutor in Manhattan—United States v. Bengis 8 —the 
article explores how a typical international wildlife trafficking 
scheme may work in practice.  By understanding how wildlife 
trafficking actually works—how a ring must work in many 
instances—we will be in a better position to know where traffickers 
necessarily must leave evidence.  With such an understanding, law 
enforcement agents and prosecutors will be in a better position to 
gather the evidence they need to prove the case.  And legislators and 
policymakers will be able to craft laws and enforcement policies 
that will help ensure that the full force of criminal law is employed 
in the fight against wildlife trafficking. 
Part I of this article provides a brief, high-level overview of 
the Bengis scheme, examining some of the methods the ring used in 
its decade-long fish trafficking scheme and focusing on where the 
                                                                                                               
 5 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING, 2015 ANNUAL PROGRESS ASSESSMENT 
(2015), at 20–23 (summarizing U.S. efforts to reduce demand). 
 6 The U.S. Ivory Crush at Times Square, FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, 
https://www.fws.gov/le/elephant-ivory-crush.html, archived at https://perma.cc/9Z8L-
H8FK (last visited Aug. 27, 2016). 
 7 See, e.g., Ivory Demand Reduction Campaign Launched in China, AFRICAN 
WILDLIFE FOUNDATION (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.awf.org/news/ivory-demand-reduc
tion-campaign-launched-china, archived at https://perma.cc/D8WD-22BP.  China recently 
announced that it would ban commerce in ivory by the end of 2017.  See, e.g., Edward 
wong & Jeffrey Gettleman, China Bans Its Ivory Trade, Moving Against Elephant 
Poaching, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/world/asia/china-ivory-ban-elephants.html?_r=0, 
archived at https://perma.cc/MB4N-KXLP. 
 8 United States v. Bengis, 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The district court 
documents referenced herein are publicly available, and many of them may be found on 
PACER.  Where possible, the docket number for particular filings is indicated with the 
citation. 
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co-conspirators had to leave behind the evidence that law 
enforcement later would use to catch them.  Part II focuses on the 
investigation and prosecutions of the ring in South Africa and in the 
United States, highlighting how the evidence that the ring members 
necessarily left behind ultimately was used to disrupt their criminal 
organization and bring them to justice.  Finally, Part III provides 
some lessons learned from the Bengis prosecution to highlight some 
of the challenges law enforcement faces in investigating and 
prosecuting wildlife trafficking.  It also offers several reform 
proposals that legislators and policymakers (both in the United 
States and abroad) might consider in their efforts to bolster the legal 
landscape, with an eye toward giving prosecutors and agents better 
tools in the fight against traffickers. 
II. A TYPICAL INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING 
SCHEME—UNITED STATES V. BENGIS 
From at least 1987 through approximately August 2001, 
Arnold Bengis headed a ring of co-conspirators engaged in an 
elaborate scheme to illegally harvest massive quantities of South 
African rock lobster and Patagonian toothfish and then export the 
illegal seafood to the United States, where they sold it for a 
significant profit.9  As part of the scheme, the Bengis organization 
routinely would harvest and purchase rock lobster far in excess of 
applicable quotas.  A report prepared by Ocean and Land Resource 
Assessment Consultants (OLRAC) estimated, conservatively, that 
the ring illegally harvested approximately 856 metric tons of South 
                                                                                                               
 9 United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that South Africa 
suffered direct harm from Bengis’ scheme to illegally harvest lobsters, and therefore is a 
victim for restitution purposes); see also Indictment at 6-8, 23-28, United States v. Bengis, 
S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2003), ECF No. 201-1 [hereinafter Indictment] (laying out 
the Grand Jury charges to defendant Bengis’ and co-defendants’ conspiracy to violate the 
Lacey Act and commit smuggling); Brief for the United States of America at 4-6, United 
States v. Bengis, 07-4895-cr (2d Cir. May 9, 2008) [hereinafter Gov’t Appeal Bf.] 
(providing the statement of facts for the defendants’ offensive conduct); Government’s 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for a Departure from the 
Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range at 7-9, United States v. Bengis, No. 1:03-cr-
00308-LAK (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2004), ECF 195-28 [hereinafter Gov’t Sentencing 
Mem.] (elaborating on the defendants’ criminal scheme to illegally import into the United 
States large quantities of South African rock lobster, as well as Patagonian toothfish). 
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Coast rock lobster during the course of the scheme, 10  which 
significantly depleted the South Coast rock lobster resource.11  One 
co-conspirator, who ended up cooperating with the investigation, 
reported that the ring also bought large quantities of illegally 
harvested West Coast rock lobster from local fishermen throughout 
the duration of the conspiracy—estimating that, in the final year of 
the scheme, approximately 93% of the West Coast rock lobster the 
ring handled had been illegally harvested. 12   By OLRAC’s 
conservative estimate, the ring caused damages of between $46.7 
million and $61.9 million to South Africa’s rock lobster resource.13 
A. The Supply Side 
Any illicit trafficking operation—whether it involves 
wildlife, narcotics, blood diamonds, guns or even counterfeit 
goods—involves a supply side, a demand side, and a flow of money.  
The supply side of the Bengis scheme was centered in Cape Town, 
South Africa, where the ring operated a fish-processing plant 
(known as Hout Bay Fishing Industries (PTY) Ltd), and where it 
engaged in the fishing and fish-processing aspects of the operation.  
Hout Bay Fishing ran several ships that were used primarily to fish 
for South Coast rock lobster.  It also bought West Coast rock lobster 
from a fleet of smaller local fishing vessels that operated around 
Cape Town.  After the West Coast and South Coast rock lobster was 
                                                                                                               
 10 Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 9–10; OCEAN AND LAND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT 
CONSULTANTS, REVISION OF CALCULATIONS OF DAMAGES SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF 
OVERCATCHES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOUTH COAST AND WEST COAST ROCK LOBSTER 
RESOURCES 38 (Table 6) (Dec. 22, 2004), ECF Nos. 195-13 & -14 [hereinafter OLRAC 
REPORT]. 
 11 J.C. Groeneveld, Under-Reporting of Catches of South Coast Rock Lobster 
Palinurus Gilchristi, With Implications for the Assessment and Management of the Fishery, 
25 AFRICAN J. MARINE SCIENCE 407 (May 2003) (attached to Gov’t Sentencing Mem., ECF 
No. 195-28); Victim Statement of H.G.H. Kleinscmidt, Deputy Director General, Marine 
and Coastal Management, at 2 (attached to Gov’t Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 195-28); 
Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 16. 
 12 Declaration of Special Agent Jeffrey Ray ¶¶ 4g-i, United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 
308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004), ECF No. 195-15 [hereinafter Ray Decl.]; Gov’t 
Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 7–8; Government’s Recommendation Concerning Restitution 
at 12, United States v. Bengis, No. 1:03-cr-00308-LAK (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004), ECF No. 
195-12 [hereinafter Gov’t Restitution Recommendation]. 
 13 United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d at 36–37; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 24–
25; Gov’t Restitution Recommendation at 6–8, 18–19; OLRAC REPORT, supra note 10, 
Summary Chart. 
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processed in Hout Bay Fishing’s factory, much of it was loaded into 
shipping containers and exported to the United States and Asia.14 
So how did the Bengis ring manage, for over a decade, to 
overharvest such a massive quantity of illegal fish, land it on docks 
in the middle of Cape Town harbor, process it in their Cape Town 
factory, move it through South African customs, and export it to the 
United States and Asia—all without being detected by South 
African authorities?  In fact, they did what any trafficker would do 
if she was trying not to get caught.  Worried that they might attract 
attention if they offloaded the illegal fish during the day, they 
offloaded it at night.  Aware that authorities could pop up on the 
docks to see them unload the illegal catch, they bribed fisheries 
inspectors to look the other way.  To keep up the façade that they 
were a legitimate operation, they reported to the South African 
fisheries authorities that they had, in fact, caught some fish.  But 
they significantly underreported their catch, which allowed them to 
“stretch” the applicable catch quotas.  And, to get the illegal fish out 
of the country without getting caught, they submitted false export 
documents to South African customs authorities, dramatically 
underreporting the quantity of rock lobster they were exporting.15 
B. The Demand Side 
The demand side of the Bengis trafficking scheme was 
centered in New York City, where the co-conspirators had an office, 
and Portland, Maine, where they had a fish-processing factory.  
Importing multiple containers of illegal fish into the United States 
required the ring members to make a choice: what should they tell 
the United States border authorities was in the containers?  On the 
one hand, they could have mislabeled the shipments, or told U.S. 
Customs the same lies that they told the South Africans, 
significantly underreporting the rock lobster in the containers.  That 
was a risky option, though, because the U.S. border officials could 
always open a container, and then they would find that there was a 
great deal more lobster in the container than the ring had declared in 
the forms they submitted to U.S. Customs.  The other option would 
                                                                                                               
 14 Indictment, supra note 9, at 14–15; Ray Decl., supra note 12 ¶¶ 4.e., 5.b., 5.f.; 
Gov’t Restitution Recommendation at 12; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 5, 8. 
 15 Indictment, supra note 9, at 6–7, 14–18; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 
10–11, 37; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 5–6. 
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be to tell the truth to U.S. Customs, accurately describing the 
contents of the containers.  But that option also involved some risk, 
because then the declarations made to the United States during 
import would be different from the declarations made in South 
Africa during export.  In the end, the co-conspirators elected to file 
truthful declarations with U.S. Customs, apparently banking on the 
idea that the U.S. and South African authorities would never 
compare notes, and that the inconsistencies between the declarations 
would go undetected. 
C. The Money Flow 
Of course, all of this overharvesting costs money.  As 
mentioned, as part of the scheme, the ring bought large quantities of 
illegal West Coast rock lobster from local fishermen; these 
fishermen needed to be paid.  Hout Bay Fishing used its own boats 
to harvest South Coast rock lobster; but the massive overharvesting 
meant the traffickers had to pay more money for extra fuel, extra 
time at sea, and extra wages to the crew.  Processing fish at Hout 
Bay Fishing’s factory also cost money, and processing all that extra 
illegal fish meant extra processing expenses. 
So how did the co-conspirators go about paying for their 
scheme?  The money due to the local South African fishermen and 
crew was tied to the quantity of fish they caught.  Paying them in 
South Africa could pose a problem, because they were making way 
too much money compared to the amount of fish that they reported 
to the fisheries inspectors.  The co-conspirators could solve that 
problem, however, by paying the local fishermen and crew the extra 
amounts in bank accounts in places outside of South Africa, such as 
Switzerland or Spain.16  But what about all of the extra profits made 
by selling illegal fish in the United States?  Some of that money had 
to go back to South Africa; Hout Bay Fishing was posing as a 
legitimate operation, and South African authorities would expect 
that it would be making at least some profit.  But it would be a 
rookie mistake to send all the money back to Cape Town, because 
the South African authorities might have figured out that Hout Bay 
Fishing was making too much money.  There were plenty of ways to 
handle the problem of too much money: they could keep the extra 
                                                                                                               
 16 Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 7; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 3, 13. 
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money in U.S. banks or, better yet, send it to accounts in countries 
such as Switzerland that were known to have strict bank secrecy 
laws.17 
The ring members had to keep track of what they had 
represented to the South African authorities, to ensure both that the 
numbers they declared kept within their allotted quotas, and that the 
revenue they reported comported with the declared catch.  But they 
also had to keep track of the true amounts they had harvested, in 
part because the wages they owed to the fishermen and to their own 
crewmembers were based on the amount caught. 18   The ring 
members kept themselves organized by using two sets of books.  
One set—termed “Sheet A”—kept track of the legal fish: that is, the 
amounts of fish that were within Hout Bay Fishing’s allotted catch 
quotas and reported to the South African fisheries authorities.  The 
amounts actually harvested were reflected in a separate sheet, 
“Sheet B,” which included the illegal fish that the ring had 
harvested or purchased.19 
III. INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING A WILDLIFE 
TRAFFICKING RING 
A. How Do We Catch the Bad Guys? 
So how do we go about investigating a wildlife trafficking 
scheme, such as the Bengis scheme described above?  When 
conducting an investigation, it helps to put yourself in the shoes of 
the bad guys, and imagine how you would execute the scheme.  The 
question to ask is simple: where does someone have to leave 
evidence when conducting a trafficking scheme, and how do we go 
about getting that evidence? 
In the Bengis scheme, the ring members had to leave 
evidence both in South Africa and in the United States.  The most 
straightforward evidence involved the conflicting representations 
that the ring made to South African and U.S. authorities about the 
quantity and type of fish in particular shipping containers.  Under 
international shipping protocols, each shipping container is assigned 
                                                                                                               
 17 Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 10; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 13–
14. 
 18 Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 19. 
 19 Ray Decl., supra note 12, ¶¶ 4.c., 4.j.; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 6–7. 
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a unique serial number.  Those numbers are included on both the 
export documents submitted when the container leaves South Africa 
and the import documents submitted when the container enters the 
United States.  The co-conspirators presumably assumed that the 
United States and South Africa never would sit down to compare 
the two sets of documents.  That was a mistake.  By matching the 
export documents with the import documents, investigators from 
South Africa and the United States were able to demonstrate clearly 
that the ring members were lying either to South Africa or to the 
United States.  Either way, the customs documents made it crystal 
clear that a crime was in the works. 
To execute the scheme, the ring had to leave other evidence 
as well.  In South Africa, for example, they had to keep records of 
the wages they paid the crew.  Because the crew’s pay was based on 
the actual quantity of lobster caught, the payroll records necessarily 
reflected the actual amounts of lobster harvested.20  The ring also 
needed two separate sets of books in order to keep track of the 
financial aspects of the scheme, so it was not surprising that the 
investigation found the “Sheet A” and “Sheet B” documents during 
their search of Hout Bay Fishing’s facility.  And, of course, the ring 
had to rely on the financial system to make the money transfers and 
payments needed to support the scheme.  Bank records in the United 
States are easily available to federal prosecutors with a grand jury 
subpoena, and a prosecutor with some effort and patience can get 
bank records from other countries through a Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty (MLAT) request.21  Gathering all of these records, 
and piecing together the money trail, provided clear evidence of the 
money that the ring collected from selling the fish, and where they 
sent the money afterwards.22 
                                                                                                               
 20 Gov’t Sentencing Bf., supra note 9, at 19. 
 21 For a helpful overview of how the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty process works, 
see Virginia M. Kendall & T. Markus Funk, The Role of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
in Obtaining Foreign Evidence, 40 A.B.A. LITIG. J. 1, 3 (2014). 
 22 For a good summary of the United States’ efforts to follow the money trail see 
Daniel W. Levy, Court Has Broad Authority Over Assets to Satisfy Restitution, LAW 360 
(Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/646418/court-has-broad-authority-over-
assets-to-satisfy-restitution, archived at https://perma.cc/F36F-SQDP.  See also Gov’t 
Mem. Of Law in Support of Application for Writ Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) at 3–6, 
United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014), ECF No. 219 
(providing investigation results regarding how the Government identified significant assets 
gathered, held and transferred by the ring among different bank accounts). 
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Of course, conducting such a large poaching and trafficking 
operation involves a large number of people, some of whom could 
serve as possible witnesses, giving the investigators a peek into the 
inner workings of the conspiracy.  In the Bengis case, cooperating 
witnesses in South Africa helped shed light on the inner workings of 
the supply side of the scheme, 23  including how the ring was 
involved for over a decade in overharvesting lobster far in excess of 
applicable quotas, and how they tried to evade detection by 
misreporting their catches to fisheries authorities, offloading illegal 
fish at night, bribing fisheries officials, and “stretching” their 
allotted quotas by falsely reporting their catch and shipments to the 
fisheries authorities and to South African customs.  Witnesses in the 
United States, in turn, would be able to tell the investigators how 
they went about importing and selling the illegal fish, and how the 
ring handled the financial side of the scheme. 
Co-conspirator witnesses are especially useful in 
establishing mental state, often the most challenging aspect of 
building a criminal case against an individual trafficking defendant.  
Through witnesses, for example, the investigation was able to show 
that one ring member had participated in altering documents to 
conceal the actual quantity of South Coast rock lobster that Hout 
Bay Fishing had harvested.24  Witnesses also reported that Arnold 
Bengis, upon learning of the investigation, had ordered employees 
to remove wage records from Hout Bay Fishing’s facility, 
apparently concerned that, because crew wages were based on 
actual catch, those records reflected the actual quantities of seafood 
harvested.25  Witnesses helped establish that the ring arranged for 
previously-disadvantaged South African citizens who did not have 
valid U.S. working permits to work for low wages at the Maine 
factory, where they were required to process illegal fish.26  And 
information from cooperating witnesses also helped establish mental 
state through conversations the ring members had during the course 
of the conspiracy.  Perhaps the most dramatic conversation shedding 
light on mental state concerned a reported conversation during 
which Arnold Bengis’ lieutenants asked about the possibility of 
being caught in the illegal trafficking scheme.  According to the 
                                                                                                               
 23 Ray Decl., supra note 12, ¶¶ 3–5.; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 7. 
 24 Indictment, supra note 9, at 26–27; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 19. 
 25 Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 19. 
 26 Indictment, supra note 9, at 7, 20, 25; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 3. 
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witnesses, Bengis responded that he likely would never be 
prosecuted because he had “fuck you money.”27 
B. The Prosecutions 
South Africa’s prosecution naturally focused on the damage 
the ring had inflicted in South Africa, targeting the poaching and 
bribery aspects of the scheme.  South Africa prosecuted the 
operations manager for Hout Bay Fishing, a number of rock lobster 
fishermen involved in poaching, and fourteen corrupt fisheries 
inspectors.28   South Africa also seized and forfeited Hout Bay’s 
factory, a number of vessels, and a large quantity of illegal lobster.  
Hout Bay Fishing entered a corporate plea of guilty, which required 
it to pay a hefty fine.29 
The U.S. prosecution also concentrated on the local impact, 
but the focus was on the harm the ring had caused in the United 
States.  Of course, the most tangible harm the ring caused was the 
poaching itself, which occurred over 7,000 miles away in Cape 
Town.  But the defendants, by bringing the illegal goods to the 
United States, also harmed U.S. markets and consumers.  By 
dumping illegal fish onto the U.S. market, they undercut legitimate 
competitors, hurt U.S. fishermen, passed off illegal lobster to 
unwitting U.S. consumers, and threatened the future viability of a 
previously healthy lobster supply.30 
The U.S. prosecution was premised primarily on defendants’ 
violations of the Lacey Act,31 one of the oldest and certainly one of 
the most powerful anti-trafficking tools around. 32   The anti-
                                                                                                               
 27 Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 46, United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Gov’t Sentencing Bf., supra note 9, at 37. 
 28 United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d at 36; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 4. 
 29 United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d at 36; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 
22. 
 30 Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 15–17 (outlining the harm to the U.S. 
market, competitors and consumers); see also S. Rep. No. 91-526, at 12 (1969) (noting that, 
“[b]y prohibiting the sale in the United States of wildlife protected by a foreign 
government, the demand [in the U.S.] for poached wildlife from that country will be 
sharply reduced”). 
 31 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2012). 
 32 Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the Fight 
Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27, 36–52 (1995) (providing 
an overview of the Lacey Act’s history and development).; see also Elinor Colbourn & 
Thomas W. Swegle, The Lacey Act Amendments of 2008: Curbing International 
Trafficking in Illegal Timber, STO36 ALI-ABA 365, 373–77 (Apr. 26, 2012)) (explaining 
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trafficking provision of the Lacey Act, Section 3372(a)(2)(A), 
focuses on protecting the integrity of the U.S. market, making it a 
crime to “import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire or purchase” 
wildlife, fish, plants and plant products that have been “taken, 
possessed, transported, or sold . . . in violation of any foreign 
law.”33  The gist of the Lacey Act is a two-step approach.  The first 
step—the “predicate law” inquiry—concerns the wildlife itself: 
were the goods at issue “taken, possessed, transported, or sold” in 
violation of some local (including foreign) law or regulation 
intended to regulate fish, wildlife or plants? 34   The second step 
focuses on the trade of those tainted goods in the United States, 
making it illegal to “import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire 
or purchase” illegal wildlife in the United States.35  The great power 
of the anti-trafficking provision of the Lacey Act is that the Act 
itself is largely agnostic about whether certain species may or may 
not be harvested.  Instead, the Act envisions that local states or 
foreign countries will set the rules governing the conservation of the 
wildlife, fish and plants in their own jurisdictions.  But, once 
wildlife, fish or plants have been “taken, possessed, transported, or 
sold” illegally under local law, the Lacey Act says you cannot bring 
those goods into the United States and trade them on U.S. markets. 
So how was the Bengis prosecution able to establish the 
“predicate law” violation—that the fish being brought into the 
United States had been “taken, possessed, transported, or sold . . . in 
violation of any foreign law”?  Proving that one particular lobster 
brought into the United States had been illegally harvested in South 
African waters no doubt would have been difficult, if not impossible.  
But, remember, the co-conspirators didn’t just overharvest; they 
also tried to hide their poaching by offloading the illegal fish at 
night when fisheries officials weren’t around, bribing fisheries 
inspectors to look the other way, misreporting their catches to the 
                                                                                                               
the importance and potency of the Lacey Act in the fight against widespread illegal 
wildlife trafficking). 
 33 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2016). 
 34 The underlying predicate law violation may be, but need not be, a criminal law 
violation.  United States v. Lee, 937 F. 2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991).  Rather, a violation of a 
civil regulation may serve as a predicate for a Lacey Act prosecution, provided the law is 
designed in part to protect wildlife, fish or plants. 
 35 See generally Robert S. Anderson & Mary Dee Carraway, Current Issues Arising in 
Lacey Act Prosecutions, 63:3 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 3, 3–7 (2015) (summarizing the Lacey 
Act’s anti-trafficking provisions). 
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authorities, and lying on the export documents they submitted to the 
South African customs officials.  Of course, as mentioned, each of 
these ploys required the ring to leave behind at least some evidence, 
and that evidence proved crucial to the investigation.  But these 
deceptions also were central to the Lacey Act prosecution, because a 
number of their evasive tricks themselves violated South African 
law.  So, while the ring members’ efforts to conceal the scheme was 
a step away from the poaching itself, those efforts also 
independently were violations of South African law, and formed 
predicate law violations for the purposes of a Lacey Act 
prosecution.36 
That’s one of the beautiful things about the Lacey Act: to 
execute their trafficking scheme without getting caught, the ring had 
to violate a whole slew of South Africa’s reporting laws and export 
regulations, a number of which were general laws governing trade.  
While those laws and regulations all served a role in protecting 
wildlife, fish and plants, they were not exclusively or specifically 
targeted at prohibiting poaching.  By violating those laws and 
regulations, the co-conspirators provided the prosecution with a 
number of the predicate law violations needed to support a 
prosecution under the Lacey Act. 
Five defendants were arrested in the U.S. case, and charged 
with violations of the Lacey Act, smuggling and conspiracy.  All 
five pleaded guilty and ultimately were sentenced to terms of 46 
months in jail for Arnold Bengis, 30 months in jail for Jeffrey Noll, 
1 year in jail for David Bengis, and probation for the two defendants 
who decided to cooperate with the U.S. prosecution. 37   The 
defendants also were required to forfeit to the United States a total 
of $7.4 million, which included $5.9 million forfeited by Arnold 
Bengis and $1.5 million forfeited by David Bengis representing 
proceeds of the sale of the Maine facility.38  Finally, after many 
years of litigation, the defendants were ordered to pay 
approximately $22.4 million in restitution to South Africa, to 
compensate the country for the harm they had caused.39 
                                                                                                               
 36 See Indictment, supra note 9, at 22–23, 29–39. 
 37 Docket Sheet, United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 38 Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 3–4. 
 39 United States v. Bengis, No. S1 03 Crim. 308 (LAK), (S.D.N.Y 2013). 
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IV. SOME TAKEAWAYS AND THOUGHTS FOR REFORM 
So what are some of the strategies that we might use to 
detect and hopefully disrupt an international wildlife trafficking 
scheme?  Some of the answers are obvious.  We start by putting 
ourselves in the shoes of the traffickers.  To begin with, they are 
well aware that poaching is illegal.  They also know that regulators 
are tasked with trying to prevent trade of illegal goods by inspecting 
goods at commercial gateways, such as ports or border crossings, 
and by requiring traders to declare the goods they are exporting and 
importing.  So, to engage in a trafficking scheme, the criminals need 
to poach in places where their activities are hard to detect or in 
situations where either no one will enforce the laws or the penalties 
are so light that the occasional slap on the wrist will not 
significantly impact their business.  They also need to figure out 
ways to circumvent the various regulations governments have put in 
place to police the international trade routes.  And they will need to 
move money around, both to fund their ongoing scheme and to 
conceal their illegal profits. 
The trafficker’s tactic is to look for, and exploit, gaps in the 
regulatory apparatus.  Worried about the game warden?  Have your 
people poach where and when she is not around or, if necessary, 
bribe her to look the other way.  Concerned about the harbormaster 
or the borders?  Learn about how the authorities actually work, and 
figure out ways to circumvent their controls, perhaps by mislabeling 
and disguising the cargo, and by misreporting the true contents in 
any declaration you submit to the authorities.  Unless the customs 
officials from the exporting country routinely exchange information 
about particular shipments with their counterparts in the importing 
country, you might decide it makes sense to tell each country 
something different about the goods you’ve packed in a particular 
container.  Finally, you need to understand how the banking system 
works, and look for ways to move money around without anyone 
figuring out that you got the money illegally and are funding a 
wildlife trafficking ring. 
How do we stop them?  The traffickers don’t hate animals; 
they’re in the illegal wildlife trade because they want to make 
money, and they have calculated that the rewards outweigh the risks.  
The key to stopping wildlife traffickers is to change the risk 
equation.  The various efforts by countries and NGOs to dampen 
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demand40 hopefully will go a long way toward lowering the reward 
side of the equation.  And law enforcement, by becoming better at 
catching the traffickers, making sure they get stiffer penalties, and 
taking away any ill-gotten gains, will help increase the risk, thus 
pushing the bad guys out of the wildlife trafficking business. 
Much of the required framework already is in place, but 
enforcement sometimes suffers because of anemic execution.  The 
first step on the enforcement side is to detect the crime and catch the 
bad guys.  The fight against poaching itself presents a tough 
problem to crack, at least right now, in part because much of the 
poaching occurs in poorer developing countries, where enforcement 
is lax and corruption is pervasive.  To help stop poaching in the 
range (or source) countries or on the high seas, it no doubt would 
help to have more and better equipped wildlife and fisheries 
enforcement officials, and it also would help if poachers faced 
serious penalties if they got caught.  Local corruption will undercut 
all of these efforts, however, both because the traffickers can pay off 
the game wardens or fisheries officials, and because they can pay 
off prosecutors or judges if they do end up getting caught. 
Much of the solution to such pervasive corruption in 
developing countries boils down to ongoing efforts by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and others to build a “rule of law” culture throughout the world.  
The Fraud Section of the U.S. Department of Justice could play a 
more constructive role in this area by concentrating some of their 
robust efforts to enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 41  on 
international environmental crimes.42  The press and NGOs also can 
play a role by directing their bright lights and publicity machines 
more closely on individual arrests and prosecutions in poaching and 
low-level trafficking cases, both to make it more difficult for 
defendants to buy their way out of an arrest by bribing a local 
                                                                                                               
 40 See AFRICAN WILDLIFE FOUNDATION, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 41 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3. 
 42 See Marcus Asner, Samuel Witten & Jacklyn DeMar, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and Overseas Environmental Crimes: How Did We Get Here and What 
Happens Next? BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY ENV’T REP. (July 12, 2012), http://www.
bna.com/overseas-environmental-crimes (discussing the connections between corruption 
and foreign environmental crimes and advocating for stricter international regulation of 
natural resources). 
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prosecutor or court official, and to publicize successful enforcement 
efforts. 
How do we go about detecting trafficking once the illegal 
goods have entered international trade channels?  A first big step 
would be to make sure people declare clearly and precisely what 
goods they are shipping.  Allowing traffickers to fall back on 
general terms—such as “frozen fish” or “fresh meat” or “wood”—
provides them with a good opportunity to avoid detection.  Opening 
and inspecting more containers, and making sure that customs and 
other border inspectors learn enough about the wildlife trade so they 
know what to look for, is another way to help catch and deter 
trafficking.  Adopting a uniform computerized system to enable 
customs officials in an exporting country to exchange export 
documentation seamlessly with customs officials in the importing 
country would help ensure that traffickers would not be able to 
conceal the scheme by telling different things to different countries 
about what they packed into a particular container. 
Once a trafficking scheme is detected, how do we go about 
using criminal law to punish the traffickers, deter others, and 
compensate the victim countries?  In the United States, we are 
helped by having robust criminal enforcement statutes, such as the 
Lacey Act.  Other countries should follow suit, both by adopting 
Lacey Act-style laws and by shoring up their existing laws to make 
wildlife trafficking a serious criminal offense. 43   Ensuring that 
judges and prosecutors treat wildlife trafficking as a serious crime, 
on par with other financial crimes such as fraud or theft, has the 
immediate and obvious benefit of helping ensure that the traffickers 
are punished for their crimes.  But there are collateral benefits as 
well.  The prospect of a lengthy prison sentence and hefty fines also 
can deter others from entering the wildlife trafficking business in 
the first place.  An added bonus is that the fear of a heavy penalty 
can prove crucial to the investigation itself as well—particularly if a 
country’s legal system has a well-developed witness cooperation 
framework44—because it gives a defendant a strong incentive to 
                                                                                                               
 43 See UNODC/WWF FISHERIES CRIME EXPERT GROUP MEETING, WWF MEETING 
REP. 11 (2016) (recommending that “states should adopt US Lacey-Act type legislation”). 
 44 The United States federal system has a robust system for encouraging defendants in 
federal criminal cases to cooperate with investigations and prosecutions.  Section 5K1.1 of 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines allows for judges to depart from the otherwise 
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range “[u]pon motion of the government stating that the 
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cooperate with the investigation and prosecution.  This cooperation 
often is a key factor both in identifying all players in a trafficking 
ring and in establishing that individual members had the requisite 
mental state to make them guilty of a crime. 
While the U.S. criminal statutes are comparatively strong, 
the United States also could take steps to enhance its laws.  One 
change that would help would be for Congress to pass a bill 
proposed by the President’s Advisory Council on Wildlife 
Trafficking to modify federal criminal law so that wildlife 
trafficking violations, especially felony violations of the Lacey Act, 
would serve as predicate violations under (i) the Travel Act,45 (ii) 
the federal money laundering statutes, 46  and (iii) the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO).47  As 
the Council explained in a public letter to Senators Lindsey Graham 
and Dianne Feinstein: 
The [proposed] modifications would provide federal 
law enforcement with additional tools in the fight 
against wildlife trafficking, both by expanding the 
reach of federal law enforcement jurisdiction in this 
area, and by increasing possible penalties.  The 
legislation also would send an important message, 
because it would signal that the United States 
considers wildlife trafficking a serious crime, in the 
same general band as a wide range of other federal 
crimes, ranging from wire fraud to Interstate 
                                                                                                               
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense.” 
 45 Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2016). 
 46 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2016). 
 47 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 (2016); Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking Recommendations to Presidential 
Task Force on Combatting Wildlife Trafficking 3 (June 9, 2014), https://www.
fws.gov/international/advisory-council-wildlife-trafficking/pdf/advisory-council-
recommendations-06-09-14.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/C6JR-NEVF [hereinafter 
Advisory Council Recommendations].  The Department of Justice recently proposed 
amending the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, to include as a predicate act 
(“specified unlawful activity”) “any act or activity constituting an offense in violation of 
the laws of the United States punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, 114th Cong., at 2 
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/849986/download, archived at https://perma.cc/
TLG2-RXR3.  The DOJ proposal as a practical matter is far more sweeping than the 
Advisory Council’s more modest proposed change to the money laundering statute. 
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Transportation of Stolen Property to narcotics 
trafficking, and set an example that will influence 
other countries to do the same.  The United States 
has supported efforts through United Nations 
agencies (such as the United Nations Organizations 
on Drugs and Organized Crime) and other fora to 
have wildlife trafficking recognized as serious crime, 
and we believe that legislation here in the U.S. 
should reflect this.48 
Finally, one powerful way to change the trafficker’s 
risk/reward equation is to reduce the trafficker’s expected reward by 
taking away his illegal profits.  A trafficker expecting to make a few 
million dollars in a trafficking scheme, and facing a small chance of 
spending a few years in jail, may decide that wildlife trafficking is 
worth the risk, especially if he can expect to end up with the money 
after he gets out of jail.  Taking away the illegal profits changes the 
equation. 
Forfeiting the proceeds of wildlife trafficking to the 
government can be a powerful tool in ensuring that traffickers are 
denied the fruits of their crime.  But making the traffickers pay 
restitution to their victims can be even more powerful in appropriate 
cases.  Following the Second Circuit’s restitution decision in 
Bengis,49 prosecutors often are able to rely on the federal restitution 
statutes, Sections 3663 and 3663A of Title 18 of the United States 
Code, to obtain restitution for victims of wildlife crime. 50   The 
Bengis decision is limited, however, because it bases restitution on 
violations of general criminal statutes, such as smuggling or 
conspiracy, and not on violations of statutes that are specifically 
directed at wildlife trafficking, such as the Lacey Act.  This means 
that, in some cases, serious wildlife criminals may be able to avoid 
                                                                                                               
 48 Letter from Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking to Senators Graham and 
Feinstein 2 (June 9, 2014), https://www.fws.gov/international/advisory-council-wildlife-
trafficking/pdf/federal-advisory-council-letter-06-09-14.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
K7U6-SWNW [hereinafter Advisory Council Letter]. 
 49 631 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 50 See United States v. Bruce, 437 F. App’x 357 (6th Cir. 2011) (ordering restitution 
to the States of Tennessee and Alabama); United States v. Oceanpro Indus., Ltd., 674 F.3d 
323, 332 (4th Cir. 2012) (ordering restitution to Maryland and Virginia); see generally 
Melanie Pierson & Meghan N. Dilges, Restitution in Wildlife Cases, 63 U.S. ATT’YS BULL., 
no. 3, 82, 86–87 (2015) (summarizing recent restitution cases in wildlife cases). 
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having to pay restitution to their victims.  It also signals that the 
United States considers wildlife trafficking to be a less serious 
crime.  A simple remedy would be to modify the federal restitution 
statutes to include wildlife crime statutes, particularly the Lacey 
Act.51 
To be sure, there may be situations in which awarding 
restitution to a victim country would not be appropriate.  In some 
cases, for example, there is no clear victim or local corruption 
makes it unclear where the restitution payments would end up.  But 
making sure appropriate victims get compensation in wildlife 
cases—whether the victims are individual landowners, states or 
countries—serves an important role in the fight against wildlife 
trafficking.  Ensuring that innocent victims receive compensation 
reflects the reality that wildlife has a real, economic value to local 
communities.  Affording victims their right to restitution also will 
give them a power incentive to work with U.S. law enforcement in 
the fight against trafficking. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Illegal wildlife trafficking has evolved into a big business in 
recent years, and the organized criminal rings that trade in wildlife, 
seafood and timber have grown ever more professional and 
sophisticated.  Their methods of moving their illegal product 
through the borders and other gateways of commerce increasingly 
resemble the approaches we usually associate with narcotics 
trafficking or other sorts of smuggling.  This Article argues that the 
key to catching the traffickers in large part boils down to 
understanding better how they go about moving their illegal goods, 
what sorts of things they have to do to evade detection, and how 
they move around money both to support the scheme and to launder 
their illegal profits.  Once we better understand how the traffickers 
must operate, we’ll be in a much better position to know where they 
leave evidence behind for us to find. 
Learning how traffickers operate and where they will leave 
evidence certainly will help in the effort to catch them and break up 
                                                                                                               
 51 See Advisory Council Recommendations, supra note 47, at 3 (recommending three 
strategic priorities set forth in the National Strategy); Advisory Council Letter, supra note 
48, at 2–3 (supporting proposed legislation against wildlife trafficking). 
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their organizations.  But that knowledge also will help legislators 
enact laws that will better arm law enforcement in the fight against 
wildlife trafficking.  Understanding, for example, that a trafficking 
ring likely will need to violate multiple local trade laws and 
regulations before it ships poached goods to sell in another country 
provides a strong argument for Lacey Act-style legislation.  If all 
countries adopted a version of the Lacey Act, for example, demand 
countries would be in a better position to combat the illegal wildlife 
trade in their own markets, which in turn will help dry up the market 
and ultimately help bolster the efforts of the source countries to stop 
local poaching. 
While the Lacey Act gives United States law enforcement a 
leg up in the fight against wildlife trafficking, the United States also 
could improve its legal framework.  As we saw in Bengis, 
trafficking rings can be complex, organized enterprises that 
establish elaborate money laundering operations to further their 
schemes.  U.S. law enforcement often relies on powerful statutes 
such as RICO or the anti-money laundering laws to break up 
sophisticated criminal organizations.  If we are serious about 
fighting wildlife trafficking, Congress should amend the law to 
make wildlife trafficking a predicate crime under the RICO, money 
laundering and Travel Act statutes.  Bolstering the federal 
restitution statutes to include wildlife trafficking also would help in 
the fight against trafficking, in part because it would give law 
enforcement another tool to ensure that traffickers don’t get to keep 
the proceeds of their illegal scheme.  Perhaps more fundamentally, 
however, bolstering the restitution statutes will help ensure that 
victim communities receive appropriate compensation for the harm 
that the traffickers inflicted.  Awarding compensation to local 
communities will contribute to the ongoing fight against trafficking 
because it will incentivize them both to value and better protect their 
own wildlife, and to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement in 
international wildlife trafficking investigations. 
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